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RELEVANT RULES CITED
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
Rule 59:

New Trials; Amendments of Judgment

(a) Grounds, Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury
or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair
trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to
them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a
result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit
of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or suprise, which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
making the application, which he could not, with reasonable
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadeouate damages, appearing- to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be
served not later than ten days after the entry of the judgment.
iii

(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for
a new trial is made under subdivision (1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has ten days after such service
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which
the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be
extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days either by
the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written
stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than ten days after
entry of judgment the court o^ its own initiative may order a new
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial
on motion or a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter
or amend the judgment shall be served not later than ten days
after entry of the judgment.

iv

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Appeal No. 20723

CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant-Respondent.
000O000

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court err or abuse its discretion in denying
appellantTs Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial or in the alternative
To Amend the Judgment of the parties* Decree of Divorce, where
that judgment incorporated the provisions of the parties1
settlement agreement?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is a divorce action in which Mrs. Elton, the
plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") appeals the Order
of the Court below denying her Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial or
in the alternative To Amend the Judgment of the parties Decree of
Divorce.

1

2.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

The appellant was awarded a Decree of Divorce
incorporating the parties1 settlement agreement reached at the
time set for trial of the parties1 consolidated causes of action
for divorce on March 19, 1985.

Addendum at A25-30.

The Decree of

Divorce as prepared by appellant's attorney was entered on April
16, 1985, and shortly thereafter appellant retained other counsel
and filed her Motion For a New Trial or in the alternative To
Amend the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce pursuant to Rule
59(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Addendum at

A31-34.
3.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW.

On May 20, 1985, the court below heard proffers of
evidence and argument on appellant's alternative motion, received
and reviewed the transcript of the divorce hearing, and denied
appellant's Motion For New Trial or in the alternative To Amend
the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce.

Addendum at A69-70.

The

appellant appeals the Order of the court below denying her
alternative Motion.
4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

At the time set for trial of the parties'
consolidated causes of action for divorce on March 19, 1985, both
parties appeared with counsel before the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, Judge of the District Court in Tooele County, prepared
2

to try their cases on the merits.

Addendum at A 2, 51,

24; T. of March 19, 1985 at 2, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 24.
Counsel for Mr. Elton, the defendant-respondent (hereinafter
n

respondentn) had arrived at the court before Judge Rigrtrup and

upon the judge!s arrival engaged in social discourse unrelated to
the partiesT case.

Addendum at A 40-41; Addendum at A 53-54, A

56-57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 11-12, 14-15.
Following conference in chambers between the court
below and counsel for both parties, in which the various issues
were discussed, the parties entered into negotiations with
counsel and reached a settlement agreement disposing of all
pending issues.

Addendum at A 2, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2;

Addendum at A51, A57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 15.

The parties

with their attorneys then came before the Court below and
appellant's attorney read the parties1 detailed settlement
agreement into the record in appellant's presence.

Addendum at

A 2-11, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2-11; Addendum at A 39-40.

The

settlement agreement was stated in clear and certain terms.
Appellant voiced no objections to the terms, nor indicated in
any manner that she did not understand the agreement in all
particulars or desired to continue the trial hearing for any
reason.

Addendum at A2, A4, T. of May 20, 1985 at 2, 4; Addendum

at A40. As the settlement agreement was read into the record,
appellant interjected more than once as to the particulars of the
3

settlement agreement, expressed her continuing comprehension of
the terms of the settlement agreement.

Addendum at A4-5, A8,

A10, T. of March 19, 1985 at 4-5, 8, 10; Addendum at A40;
Addendum at A51-53, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9-11.

When aopellant's

attorney concluded reading the settlement agreement into the
record and in response to the specific questions asked of her by
the Court below, appellant specifically indicated that she had
heard the agreement and clearly expressed her understanding of
the terms of the settlement and her agreement to be bound by
those terms.

Addendum at A-ll, T. of March 19, 1985 at 11;

Addendum at A51, A53, T. of May 20, 1985 at 9, 11; Addendum at
A39-40.

Immediately thereafter, the respondent and his attorney

were excused from the proceedings and upon appellant's testimony
as to jurisdiction and grounds she was awarded a Decree of
Divorce.

Addendum at A12-13, T. of March 19, 1985 at 12-13.

Appellant's attorney prepared the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, which were approved
by respondent's attorney and signed and entered by the court
below on April 16, 1985. These final documents approved and
incorporated the parties' settlement agreement as read into the
record on March 19, 1985 by providing for the distribution of
the parties' property and awarding neither party alimony, among
other things.

Addendum at A15-30.

4

Shortly thereafter the appellant retained new counsel
and filed her Motion For a New Trial or in the alternative To
Amend the Judgment of her Decree of Divorce as provided by Rule
59(a) and (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
A31-34.

Addendum at

In support of her motion appellant alleged, basically,

that she did not hear or agree to the settlement agreement, that
there were unfair irregularties in the proceedings, that there
was insufficient evidence to support the judgment distributing
the parties1 property, and an abuse of discretion in failing to
award her any alimony.

Addendum at A31-37.

Upon hearing

appellant's Motion, the court below determined there was no
irregularity or abuse of discretion, suprise or new evidence
supporting appellant's Motion and that there was no substantial
basis for granting a new trial or amending the judgment.
Addendum at A66, A67, T. of May 20, 1985 at 24, 25. Accordingly,
the court below entered its Order denying appellant's motion for
a new trial or in the alternative to amend the judgment.
Addendum at A69-70.
SUMMARY OF ARGDMENT
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the ruling of
the Court below denying her motion for a new trial or in the
alternative to amend the judgment of her Decree of Divorce, that
court was in an advantageous position to receive the evidence
presented, and to become acquainted with the parties' problems

5

and the totality of the circumstances relating to the issues.
Despite the subjective dissatisfaction 0* one party to a divorce
action, unless there is a clear showing of misapplication of the
law or abuse of discretion, then the ruling of the trail court in
awarding a Decree of Divorce should not be disturbed.
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976).

Eastman v.

This standard does not

significantly vary where the court below has had the opportunity
to reconsider its judgment upon a Rule 59 motion for a new trial
or in the alternative to amend the judgment.

The ruling of the

court below will be disturbed only where there is a clear abuse
of discretion.

Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981).

In the present case, appellant has utterly failed to
show a misapplication of the law or a clear abuse of discretion
by the court below.

Although divorce proceedings are equitable

in nature, when a decree of divorce is based upon a property
settlement sanctioned by the court, equity is not available to
reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away.
Only under the most compelling circumstances will there be an
abrogation of such an agreement and the judgment based thereon.
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980); Despain v. Despain,
610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980).

The question as to whether appellant

agreed to and should be bound by her settlement agreement was one
for the trial court to determine within its descretion.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).

6

Klein v.

Here, the evidence clearly shows that appellant could
have litigated any issues of alimony and property, but instead
entered into a settlement agreement at the time set for trial of
those issues.

She heard, understood, and consented to be bound

by the terms of her settlement agreement.

That settlement

agreement was accepted and approved by the court below under
circumstances where the trial court had an opportunity to
consider the representations of the parties1 counsel on the
issues to be litigated.

The Decree of Divorce incorporated the

parties' settlement agreement.

Though appellant asserts a

grossly disproportionate division of the parties1 assets, her
assertion is unfounded and the evidence fails to show that the
division was unfair.

There are simply no compelling reasons to

disturb the sanctity of appellant?s settlement agreement or the
judgment of the court below incorporating the same.

The court

below properly exercised its discretion, in view of the evidence
presented, in refusing to abrogate the provisions of appellant's
settlement agreement.
Nor does the weight of the evidence presented to the
court below support any ground for a new trial or an amendment of
the Decree of Divorce.

There was clearly no irregularity in the

divorce proceedings or abuse of discretion by the Court below
which might have prevented appellant from having a fair hearing
on the issues had she chosen to do so.

7

Although appellant

asserted a physical disability as grounds for her Rule 59 Motion,
there is firm evidence that the disability was know by appellant
prior to trial and in no way interfered with her opportunity for
a fair hearing.

Further, the parties' assets were known to

appellant prior to the day of trial in this matter, and though
appellant now disputes their values she had ample opportunity
to determine their value prior to trial and could have produced
evidence as to their values at that time.

Any accident or

suprise to appellant could with ordinary prudence have been
guarded against.

Any newly discovered evidence could with

reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at trial
had appellant chosen to do so.
Appellant's attempted analogy between summary
proceedings and consent judgments is misplaced and there is no
authority at law to support it.

Appellant had her opportunity

to fully litigate any issues in dispute but on the day of trial
chose instead to enter into a settlement agreement disposing of
all issues.

This is sufficient evidence justifying the judgment

of the court below. The decision of the trial court is in accord
with the law in upholding the sanctity of settlement agreements
and judgments based thereon.

Land, supra; Despain, supra.

Appellant has not met her burden of showing
misapplication of the law.

Further, she has utterly failed to

show a clear abuse of discretion to such a decree that the

8

judgment of the Court below and its Order denying appellant her
Rule 59 motion are manifestly unfair and inequitable,
ARGDMENT
POINT I
THE CONSIDERED AWARD AND ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE
PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT A CLEAR
SHOWING BY APPELLANT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW.
It is clear from appellant1s brief that she is
dissatisfied with Judgre Rigtrup's Order denying her Motion For a
New Trial or in the alternative To Amend the Judgment of her
Decree of Divorce.

That Decree of Divorce, however, approved and

incorporated the provisions of her settlement agreement, with
which appellant has evidently become dissatisfied and in effect
now desires to revise.

It is not unusual that a party to the

inherently stressful process of divorce becomes dissatisfied
with the rulings of the trial court, however that fact alone is
not indicative of the propriety and merits of those rulings.
This Court has on innumerable occasions held that where
a divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial
judge is favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy.
It is only in those few instances in which the appellant can
clearly demonstrate a manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law, such that the orders of the trial court are
9

inequitable in light of the circumstances of the case, that the
considered judgment of the trial judge will be disturbed.

Such

a position is logically grounded upon the advantaged position of
the trial court, which has observed the witnesses, received
evidence presented on the issues and become acquainted with the
parties problems and the circumstances relating to the issues.
As observed in Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976):
We have many times stated that even though
proceedings in divorce cases are equitable,
in which this Court may review the evidence,
due to the prerogative and advantaged position
of the trial court, we give considerable
deference to his findings and judgment; and
we do not disturb them unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or he
has abused his discretion or misapplied
principles of law.
558 P.2d at 516 (footnote citation omitted).
In view of the considerable discretion accorded to the trial
judge and this Court's requirements that a clear abuse of
discretion or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a
condition precedent to any substitution of the trial judge's
ruling, the burden is on the party dissatisfied with the trial
court's decision to demonstrate such error.
565 P. 2d 409 (Utah 1977).

English v. English,

As recently summarized in Christensen

v. Christensen, 628 P. 2d 1279 (Utah 1981):
On review, this Court will accord considerable
deference to the judgment of the trial court
due to its advantaged position and will not
disturb the action of that court unless the
10

evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial court abused its
discretion or misapplied principles of law...
628 P.2d at 1299 (footnote citation omitted).
Nor does this standard of review significantly vary
merely because appellant faults the decision of the trial court
in denying a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or in the alternative
to amend its judgment.

As stated in Lembach v. Cox, 639 P. 2d

197 (Utah 1981):
...the trial court has a broad discretion...
and...his ruling...should not be overturned
unless it appears that his action was
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed
any reasonable bounds of discretion.
639 P.2d at 201 (footnote citation omitted).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court below is
presumed valid and will not be disturbed unless appellant has
demonstrated that the trial judge has misapplied relevant law to
such a degree that the Orders are manifestly unfair and
inequitable or has so clearly abused his discretion as to result
in substantial prejudice.
POINT II

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN OF

DEMONSTRATING MISAPPLICATION OF LAW OR CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION;
THEREFORE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER ENTERED BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
IN THEIR ENTIRETY.
Appellant, though clearly dissatisfied with the rulings
entered by Judge Rigtrup, utterly fails to demonstrate a

11

misapplication of law rendering the judgment of the Court below
manifestly unfair or such a clear abuse of discretion resulting:
in substantial prejudice.
As this Court has held in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d
1248 (Utah 1980):
.•.when a decree is based upon a property settlement agreement, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the Court, equity must take such
agreement into consideration. Equity is not
available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted away simply because one
has come to regret the bargain made.
Accordingly, the law limits the continuing
jurisdiction of the Court where a property
settlement is incorporated into the decree,
and the outright abrogation of the provisions
of such an agreement is only resorted to with
great reluctance and for compelling reasons.
605 P.2d at 1251 (footnote citation omitted).

Despain v.

Despain, 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980).
Although appellant asserts in her Brief that she has
not had her day in court (Brief of Appellant at 10, 11) she was
clearly accorded a full opportunity to litigate every pending
issue of her cause of action on the day of trial, including those
of alimony and property.

Both parties appeared before the trial

court on that date with the benefit of counsel.

Addendum at

A2, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2; Addendum at A51, A66, T. of May
20, 1985 at 9, 24.

Instead of proceeding through trial, however,

appellant entered into negotiations through her attorney and
reached a settlement agreement disposing of all pending issues

12

including those of alimony and property.

Addendum at A2, T. of

March 19, 1985 at 2; Addendum at A51, A59, T. of May 20, 1985 at
9, 15. This settlement agreement was sanctioned by the trial
court and incorporated in appellantfs Decree of Divorce.

See

Addendum at A15-30.
Nor are there any compelling reasons why appellant's
settlement agreement as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce
should be abrogated.

Appellant heard, understood and assented to

the settlement agreement without reservation.

She was present

with her attorney at the time her settlement agreement was read
into the record.

Addendum at A2-13, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2-13;

Addendum at A39-40.
precise terms.

The agreement was stated in clear and

Appellant interjected more than once as to the

particulars of the agreement and otherwise indicated her
continuing comprehension of the terms of the agreement.
voiced no objections nor expressed any confusion.

She

Addendum at

A4-5, 8, 10, T. of March 19, 1985 at 4-5, 8, 10; Addendum at A2;
Addendum at A51-53, T. of May 20, 1985 at Q-ll.

Although

appellant asserted in her motion for a new trial or in the
alternative to amend the judgment that she did not hear the
proceedings due to a hearing impairment and did not agree to
the settlement agreement as read into the record, the transcript
belies her assertion:

13

THE COURT:

Mrs. Elton, I assume you!ve heard
what's been read into the record?

MRS. ELTON: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you understand those terms?

MRS. ELTON: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you agree to be bound by
those terms?

MRS. ELTON: Yes.
Addendum at All; T. of March 19, 1985 at 11.

The question as to

whether appellant agreed to and should be bound by her settlement
agreement was one for the trial court to determine.
Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975).

Klein v.

Clearly under the facts in the

present case the trial court properly acted within its descretion
in refusing to abrogate the settlement agreement or alter its
judgment.
Further, as noted in Klein, supra:
It is the established rule that a stipulation
pertaining to matters of divorce and property
rights therein, though advisory upon the Court
and would usually be followed unless the Court
thought it unfair or unreasonable, is not
necessarily binding on the Court anyway. It
is only a recommendation to be adhered to if
the Court believes it to be fair and reasonable.
544 P.2d at 476 (footnote citation omitted).
Here, on the day of trial and before the parties
entered into their settlement agreement, the trial court was
apprised of the outstanding issues through a pre-trial conference
with the parties1 attorneys.

Addendum at A2, T. of March 19,
14

1985 at 2.

Details relating to distribution of the parties'

property were discussed, and afterwards the settlement agreement
was reached and read into the record.
May 20, 1985 at 15-16.

Addendum at A58-59, T. of

The settlement agreement was approved by

the Court below and incorporated into the Decree of Divorce.

In

this context the Court below was in an advantageous position to
consider the fairness of the settlement agreement in view of
representations by counsel for the parties at the pre-trial
conference.

It was appropriate for the court below to consider

what was contained in the settlement agreement in addition to
what counsel represented on the issues as part of the totality
of the circumstances in determining what will be a just and
equitable decree.

Klein, supra at 476.

Obviously the trial

court did not view the settlement agreement as unreasonable.
Rather, he approved it and ordered it incorporated into the
Decree of Divorce.
Having a further opportunity to reconsider its decision
upon appellant's post-trial motion, the trial court was not
convinced by appellant's proffers and supporting affidavits that
there were other compelling reasons to abrogate the settlement
agreement or alter its judgment.

Clearly, appellant had every

opportunity to litigate issues of alimony and property at trial,
had she desired to do so.

Although appellant in her brief

argrues she has suffered a reduced earning capacity due to a
15

hearing loss during the marriage which places her in risk of
becoming a public charge (Brief of Appellant at 6-7), the record
is devoid of any evidence to corroberate her self-serving
allegations which were disputed by respondent•

Appellant admits

she was hearing-impaired prior to the parties marriage.
at A49, T. of May 20, 1985 at 7.

Addendum

It was undisputed that she was

unemployed at the time of her marriage, receiving disability for
her hearing impairment, and is now capable of employment and
involved in her family's investment affairs.

In addition, she

receives a monthly income from the parties' settlement agreement.
Addendum at A54-55, T. of May 20, 1985 at 273*

There was no

compelling reason to alter the Court's order relating to alimony.
Neither was there a compelling reason to alter the distribution
of the parties' property.

Although appellant argues a great

disparity in the award, primarily by isolating from the total
assets a certain parcel of real property the value of which was
disputed (Addendum at A46, T. of May 20, 1985 at 4 ) , she failed
to consider the value of other assets she received in relation
to the total assets available for distribution between the
parties, together with the value of premarital assets and
inheritance.

Addendum at A50, A54-55, A61, A64-65, T. of May

20, 1985 at 8, 12-13, 19, 22-23.

The appellant had the

opportunity to litigate the issue of property at trial, the court
below considered the property values prior to the parties'
16

settlement agreement, and its distribution again upon appellant's
Rule 59 Motion.

The court below was not convinced of any great

disparity in the distribution, nor does the evidence clearly
indicate any great disparity.

Addendum at A57, A58-59, A61, T.

of May 20, 1985 at 15, 16-17, 19.

The court below, consistent

with the latitude of discretion to which it is accorded, nroperly
refused to abrogate the parties1 settlement agreement.
Nor was there a clear abuse of discretion by the court
below in denying appellant's motion for a new trial or in the
alternative to amend the judgment.

Appellant has failed to

establish any irregularity in the proceedings of the court
below which prevented her from having a fair trial.
clearly showed that the

The evidence

f!

irregularityn in the proceedings of

March 19, 1985 as alleged by appellant in support of her motion
was merely courteous social discourse between respondent's
counsel and the court below, resulting from an unanticipated
encounter by respondent's counsel with the trial judge and
entirely unrelated to the proceedings between the parties.
Addendum at A53-54, A56-57, T. of May 20, 1985 at 11-12, 14-15;
Addendum at A2-3.

There was no accident or suprise which

appellant could not have guarded against.
had existed for years.

Her hearing impairment

Addendum at A49, T. of May 20, 1985 at 7.

She knew prior to the proceedings on March 19, 1985 that her
hearing aid was malfunctioning and that she had an ear infection.
17

Addendum at A36.

The trial date had been set for several weeks

and her attorney was present at the proceedings to represent her
interests.

She could have communicated her inability to go

forward with the proceedings or requested a continuance, but she
did neither.

Addendum at A66, T. of May 20, 1985 at 24.

Contrary to appellant's claimed inability to hear at her trial
proceeding as grounds for a new trial or amendment of the
judgment under Rule 59, the record discloses that appellant
heard, understood, and agreed to the terms of her settlement
agreement.

Addendum at All, T. of March 19, 1985 at 11. The

evidence clearly disputed appellant's assertion of accident or
suprise.
The record is also devoid of any evidence of newly
discovered evidence which could not with reasonable diligence
have been discovered or produced for trial.

If, as appellant

asserts, her hearing impairment worsened during the course of her
marriage, then any such evidence was known to her prior to her
trial date and could have been produced at that time.

Appellant

does not claim the parties owned any assets which were unknown to
her at the time of trial and all of the parties' assets were
itemized and distributed in the Decree of Divorce.

At this late

date, and evidently based on her sole opinion, she merely
attempts to dispute the value of those assets, an issue which
appellant had ample opportunity during the discovery process of
18

her divorce action to determine and an opportunity to establish
at trial.

Her opinion valuation of the assets was disputed by

respondent, and through expert testimony he was prepared at trial
to establish the value of those assets.
T. of May 20, 1985 at 8-9, 24.

Addendum at A50-51, A66,

Appellant clearly could have

discovered and produced at trial al] evidence relating to the
parties1 property.

Under similar circumstances this Court has

upheld the decision of the trial court in denying appellant's
Rule 59 motion.

Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d

241 (1974); Tangero v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390
(1960).
The evidence is clearly sufficiently to justify the
judgment of the court below.

Where appellant, in the presence

of the trial court and with the benefit of her attorney
participated in reaching a settlement agreement, heard the
agreement, understood it, and agreed to be bound by it.

Addendum

at A4-5, A8, A10-11, T. of March 19, 1985 at 2, 4-5, 8, 10-11.
The court below was justified in entering its judgment upon
appellant's stipulation.

Though appellant argues in her brief

that judgment in a divorce proceeding, as to which all issues in
dispute have been stipulated, is a summary proceeding attaining
the status of a summary judgment, her attempted analogy is
misplaced and has no basis at law.

There were no facts or other

issues disputed at the divorce trial in this matter; there was
19

instead an agreement settling the pending litigation.

Since no

genuine issue of material fact existed, or was claimed to exist,
it was entirely appropriate for the court below to enter its
judgment in conformity with the parties' agreement.

In reviewing

the rulings of the court below the standard to be applied by this
Court is not, nor could it be, whether a genuine issue of
material fact existed at trial.

Clearly there were none.

Rather, the standard is whehter the court below clearly abused
its discretion in denying appellant's Rule 59 alternative motion.
As clearly shown, supra, the trial judge properly exercised his
broad discretion in denying appellant's motion for a new trial or
to amend the judgment previously entered.
CONCLDSION
In divorce cases this Court has invariably held that
the decision of the trial judge is to be respected unless it
clearly appears that he has abused his discretion or manifestly
misapplied relevant law to the substantial prejudice of the
appealing party.

This standard does not significantly vary where

the court below has had the opportunity to reconsider its
judgment upon a Rule 59 motion for a new trial or in the
alternative to amend the judgment.

It appropriately grants

deference to the advantaged position of the trial judge who has
received evidence presented on the issues and become acquainted

20

with the parties, their problems, and the circumstances relating
to the issues.
Appellant's present dissatisfaction with the judgment
of the trial court and its ruling denying her Rule 59 alternative
motion is neither an appropriate nor sufficient ground for
reversal of the trial court's orders.

The court below

appropriately applied relevant law on the issues and did not
agree that appellant was justified in seeking to reopen its
judgment.

Nowhere does appellant isolate an instance in which

Judge Rigtrupfs judgment, and order denying her motion,
prejudicially errs against her or is not supported by substantial
evidence.

The evidence clearlv shows that appellant heard,

understood, participated in, and agreed to be bound by the terms
of her settlement agreement with the full benefit of legal
representation and an opportunity to litigage any issues had she
chosen to do so.

The judgment of the court below which approved

and incorporated appellant's settlement agreement cannot be
legitimately analogized with that of a summary iudgment where
factual issues are in dispute and the question of whether there
were disputed facts is on review.
issues at trial.

Here there were no disputed

It was clearly within the trial court's

discretion to determine whether appellant understood and agreed
to the settlement agreement, and there was clearly substantial
evidence that she did so.

21

Nor are there any compelling reasons shown by appellant
to support an abrogation of her settlement agreement and the
judgment of the trial court entered in conformity with that
agreement.

Appellant had unequivocably agreed to the

distribution of the parties1 assets and did not seek alimony.
She should not now, upon settling all issues at trial, be
accorded a second opportunity for trial simply because she has
come to regret her decision.
In reconsidering its judgment, the court below properly
exercised its broad discretion in denying appellantTs Rule 59
motion.

The evidence clearly shows there was no irregularity in

the divorce proceedings, abuse of discretion, accident, sunrise,
or new (and previously unavailable) evidence which prevented
appellant from proceeding through a fair trial had she chosed to
do so, or which rendered the court's judgment unfair.

Her valid

settlement agreement was a sufficient basis upon which the trial
court could enter its judgment and it clearly was not error in
law to do so.

Appellant simply failed to establish any grounds

sufficient for a new trial or an amended judgment.

The decision

of the court below denying appellant's Rule 59 motion should be
affirmed, and the judgment reflected by the parties1 Decree of
Divorce and based on their settlement agreement should be upheld.

22

There is no manifest injustice or clear abuse of discretion in
this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of January, 1986.

DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN

B. L. DART

JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of January,

1986, I hand delivered four copies of the foregoing Respondent's
Brief to:
William B. Parsons, III
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

5
vs.

6
7

Consolidated Cases
84-347
84-348

CURTIS BECK ELTON,

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

8
9
10

BE IT REMEMBERED:

11

That the above-entitled matter

12

came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of March, 1985J

13

at the hour of 11:15 a.m., before the Honorable Kenneth

14

Rigtrup, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of

15

the State of Utah, at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,

16

sitting without a jury, and the following proceedings were

17

had.

18
19

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

E. H. Fankhauser, Esq.
Attorney at Law
660 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Ucah

For the Defendant:

B. L. Dart, Esq.
310 South Main," Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah

20
21
22
23
24
25

6AY12 B. CAMPESIL
fittNNSO SHORTHAND REPORTER
* fiALT lAKc CITY, UTAH
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1

£52£EEEI!i5§.

2

(The Court having conferred with counsel off the

3

record, the following proceedings were had in chambers

4

at 11:15 a.m.)

5

THE COURT:

This is the time and place set

6

for the hearing in the matter of Joan H. Elton versus

7

Curtis Beck Elton, 84-347 and 84-348, which cases were

3

consolidated.

9

in person and is represented by E. H. Fankhauser, that

10

The record may show that plaintiff is present

defendant is present in person and is represented by B. L,

H j Dart.
The Court has discussed the various issues with

12

13 J counsel, and the parties hcive discussed the issues with
14 I their attorneys.

The Court is advised that the parties have

a settlement in this case.

15

Is that true?

16 I

MR. FANKHAUSER:

17

MR. DART:

18

THE COURT:

19

Yes, your Honor.

Yes, your Honor.
Would you please state what the

settlement is?
i

t

20 I

MR. FANKHAUSER:

21 I wrong, Bert.

Okay.

Correct me if I'm

i

22 j and clear of any claims of Mr. Elton, the residence she
owned before marriage at 280 Mar Visca in Tooele, subject

24 I to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness owing thereon.
25

;

The plaintiff, Mrs. Elton, would receive, free !

I

23

«

This is in her name and she will continue to pay that.

A-2

She will receive all of the furniture and furnish-]
ings, appliances and personal property in her possession,
located at the home, with some exceptions, and we'll note
those later•

She will receive her '69 Corvette automobile

owned before marriage,
THE COURT:

1969 Corvette?

MR. FANKHAUSER:

Correct,

All of the ten

shares of American Western Insurance that she owned before
marriage.

She will receive a 1981 Toyota pickup truck with

the shell, subject to the balance owing to the Tooele
Federal Credit Union, which she will assume and pay and
hold Mr. Elton harmless.
THE COURT:

Toyota truck?

MR. FANKHAUSER:

Yes.

And she will hold

Mr. Elton harmless on that.
THE COURT:

As I understand it, you are co-

signed on that loan; is that correct:?
18 :

MR, ELTON:

I went down tz

the credit union, 4

!3 I and they said that than lean has beer, paid eff.
20
21

I presume

chat she refinanced it.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

She refinanced it, so

22

there's no problem with that.

23

shares of Pacific Gas & Electric stock.

24 I

THE COURT:

25

MR. DART:

She will receive the 118

How many shares?
It's 100 shares of Pacific Gas &

3
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Electric redeemable preferred, and 18 shares of common,
MR. FANKHAUSER:
down.

I was going to break that

She would receive that as part of the distribution

of the retirement account, or Mr. Elton's IRA account with
the Tooele Federal Credit Union.
over to her.

She will also receive two of the lots at

Gold Hill town site.

Which two do you want?

MR. DART:
up —

That will be transferred

We just thought we would set it

are they all four together?
MR. ELTON:

No.

I purchased them so that I

own a little corner of each major lot.

They are spread

out.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

There's two in Block C

and two in Block D.
MR. ELTON:

They are not adjacent.

Any two

that she would like.
MRS.

ELTON:

THE COURT:

~

Plaintiff to have choice.

MRS. ELTON:
later?

Wait until I talk to

Can I stipulate which ones

I haven't even seen the area.
MR. DART:

That choice to be made within 30

days, otherwise she can have "C" and he have "D".
THE COURT:

You can run an ad in the Wall

Street Journal to —

i

MR. FANKHAUSER:

This is out by Fish Springs,

4
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out in that area.
MR- FANKHAUSER:
saying?

Do you understand what hers

You get your choice within 30 days, otherwise

he'll get the tv/o in Block C and you will get the two in
Block D.
MRS. ELTON:

It was my understanding they

were right in Wendover.
MR. ELTON:
MR. DART:

They are south of Wendover.
How far south of Wendover is this

property?
MR. ELTON: It is south of Wendover by
probably 50 miles.

It's in that Fish Springs-Calio area.

MR. DART:

He only paid $80 apiece for them.

MR. FANKHAUSER:

Okay.

That's two lots.

Right.

;
In addition, Mr. Elton will pay to Mrs. Elton as '
i

her share of the real properties, principally her home and
the triplex, $10,000 payable at the rate of S300 a month
wich 10% interest, and than is zz be secured by a mortgage
lien on the triplex until paid*
MR. DART:

1

It's $3 00 per month or more.

He

can prepay that.
MR- FANKHAUSER:
of the property.

Yes, because it's a division

So there's no penalty for prepayment on

that.

5
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She will retain her own personal property, clothing, jewelry and effects.
Mr. Elton will then be awarded the 1978 Toyota
i
i

land cruiser, the 1978 Chev pickup v/ith camper.

As I under-

stand it, he has a one-third interest in that?
THE COURT:
MR. DART:

'78 Toyota.
Land cruiser.

THE COURT:

Next item.

MR. DART:

"78 Chevrolet pickup.

third interest on it, with camper.

He has a

He owns a third of a
i

•53 Wxlley's jeep, and he owns a Chevrolet Vega that he
owned before the marriage.

And he owns ah interest in a

;
I
—
t

\

THE COURT:

What was after the jeep?

S

i
MR. DART:

A Chevrolet Vega, owned before

J
i

marriage.

Then there1s an '85 Chevrolet van, subject to the

loan obligation owing against it.

He further would be

awarded his retirement in the United States Government.
will be awarded the triplex free and clear zt
che plainciff.
paid off.

Well, there's no balance.

He

any clai~ of

Thac finally goc

Subject only to her lien for her property settle-

ment.
THE COURT:

What do you want, a note and

;
i
j
t

trust deed for your security?
MR. DART:

Itfs in joint tenancy currently,

and we would like to either

A-6

—

THE COURT:
MR- DART:

Deed out subject to

—

Deed out subject to that, then

have another quit-claim deed held subject to when the
balance is paid.
They will each of them be awarded their own
checking accounts or savings accounts that they may have.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

She is awarded the building

materials that she has in her possession.
MR. DART:

And there's a bedroom set that

was owned by his mother, and also a washer and dryer that
are located in his residence that will be awarded to him.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

Those were the items that

came from his mother's property.
THE COURT:
dresser and

What did you say besides the

—
MR. FANKHAUSER:
MR. DART:

A washing machine.

One thing we have net discussed

is that there are some currently outstanding charge ace sunns,
and we would agree to assume and pay the Master Charge and
the Visa.

I think the ether should be assurrec by her.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

We would agree to take the

Penney's.
THE COURT:
MR. DART:

Defendant to pay Visa?
And Master Charge.

THE COURT:

And Master Charge.

And all

/
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others except as specifically mentioned?
MR. DART:

No.

Our concern is that there are'

some that we didn't know about, including the ones he's
talking about.

So those were the only ones incurred

|

specifically during the marriage that we would assume.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

There is a Penney*s that

she will assume, then Sears.
MR. DART:

Montgomery Ward.

Those are the

only three, aren't they?
MRS. ELTON:
MR. DART:

That's it.

Each to pay own after separation
i

in July of 1984.

j

i
THE COURT:
MR. DART:

July 1, 1984.
Defendant will agree to pay

a portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees in the sum of

:
j
;

$750, to be paid within 30 days from the entry of the dei

cree.

And there is to be no alimony awarded.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

•

Did ycu say he got the boat

I meter and trailer also?
MR. DART:

I said all vehicles in his posses-

sion or personal property in his possessionMR. FANKHAUSER:
MR. DART:

And the Honda motorcycle?

And the same for whatever she

.

has.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

He recently purchased a home

8
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also, your Honor, and I don't remember the address.
MR. DART:

That's located at 291 East Broad-

way, and he will be awarded than subject to any liabilities
owing against it, free of any claims of Mrs. Elton.
THE COURT:
MR. DART:

West Broadway?
East Broadway,

Further, each of

them would be awarded any inheritance that they have not
yet received or would anticipate receiving from their own
parents.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

Free and clear of any claims

of the other.
MR. DART:

I think that covers it.

MR. FANKHAUSER:
MR. DART:

I think that does.

One other thing that he had pre-

marriage are some Scotch whiskey futures, v/hich he will
retain subject to any obligation owing on that.

I think

that's it.
As part cf the stipulation, the defendant vculc
v/ithdraw his complaint filed in a ccr.panicn acticr. which
was served as an answer and counterclaim in this action,
and consent that his default be entered and that the plaintiff be awarded a divorce on her grounds of mental cruelty.
We would request, in light of the fact that there
are no children as issue of the marriage, the length of
time since the separation, and the legislative intent now

9
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1

in place but not yet at law, I don't suppose, that the d e -

2

cree of divorce be made final on entry.
THE COURT:

3
4

MR. D A R T :

6

THE COURT:

Would you like a doughnut?
All right.

What happens with

respect to the '84 tax returns?
MR. D A R T :

8
9

It usually takes a pie to get

that accomplished.

5

7

;

They have not been filed, and it

would be his intention to file separately.

We've had some

10

problems getting some records, and it would be his desire

11

to do that.
MR. FANKHAUSER:

12
13

Do you want to file

separately?

14

MRS. ELTON:

Yes.

15

MR. FANKHAUSER:

Okay.

If you need some

16

information, let me know, B e r t , and I'll be glad to help

17

you o u t .
Each zo sicr. necessary iccumencs.

18

THE COURT:

,0 '

\ro

2Q .

MR. FANKHAUSER: Each cc execute any and all

~\zzf

21 j documents necessary to carry our avard of properties.
22

THE C O U R T :

M r . Eicon, you have heard what's

23

been read into the record, have you not?

24

MR. ELTON:

Yes.

25

THE C O U R T :

Do you understand those terms?

10
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1
2

MR. ELTON:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

Do you agree to be bound by those
i

3

terms?

4
S

6

MR. ELTON:

Yes, I do.

THE COURT:

Mrs. Elton, I assume you've heard;

what's been read into the record?

7

MRS. ELTON:

8

THE COURT:

9

MRS. ELTON:

10

Yes.
Do you understand those terms?
Yes.

THE COURT:

11

Do you agree to be bound by those

terms?

12

MRS. ELTON:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. FAMKHAUSER:

15

THE COURT:

Yes.
Anything else?
Reluctantly, but yes.

i

If you win, you do the drafting. !
i
16
MR. FANKHAUSER:
Well, I hate to do the
!
i
17
!
drafting, but I guess I'd better. They would up the at18 : rorr.ey's fees ar.cther S250
i

MR. DART:
THE COURT:

20
21
22
23

I'll draft them if ycu war.t.

her default.

We'll excuse you, then, and take

Take a doughnut with you.

(Whereupon, Mrs. Dart and defendant withcraw.)
JOAN H. ELTON,

24

called as a witness on her own behalf, being

25

first duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole

11
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1

truth and nothing but the truth, was examined

2

and testified as follows:

3
4

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FANKHAUSER:

5

Q

Would you state your full name for the record?

6

A

Joan Harris Caldwell Elton.

7

Q

How long have you lived in Tooele County?

3

A

A l l my life.

g J

Q

Why d o you want a divorce?

10

A

Because of cruelty.

11

Q

What kind of cruelty?

12

A

Every kind, from being smacked in the face f which

13

caused me to end up wearing a hearing-aid, which I did not

14

wear in the p a s t .

15

Q

Anything else?

16

A

I did have a disability retirement, but I didn't

17 I have to wear it until he smacked m e .
13 j

Q

Anything else?

ig [

A

That's the main thing.

20 !
2i

THE COURT:

Has that caused you physical and

mental pain and suffering?

22 I

THE WITNESS:

Y e s , it has.

23

THE C O U R T :

24 I

MR. FANKHAUSER:

25

THE COURT:

Granted final on entry.
All right.

Do you want your former name

12
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I
restored?

1

MRS. ELTON:

2
Elton.

3

No.

I'm going to keep that name.
THE COURT:

4
to you.

5

I want to keep the name

All right.

Granted.

Good luck

You can have two doughnuts.

(Mr. Dart re-enters chambers.)

6

MR. DART:

7

Mr. Elton asked if we could have

8

an understanding of when the $300 a month starts, and

9

apparently he was paying $300 on the prior order.
l
Well, the prior order was that he"
I

THE COURT:

10
11

pay four hundred, the four hundred due for February plus

12

payable March the 14th.

13

15th of each month thereafter?

14

MR. FANKHAUSER:

How about the 15th of April and the

That's all right.

You'll

!
i

15

get $300 a month the 15th of each month.

,'

16

THE COURT:

i

17

MR. DART:

18 |

Commencing Aoril 15th.

i

All right.

(thereupon, the proceedings were ccr.cluced at 11:30

i

is | a .r..)
20

•

*

*

*

21
22
23
1

24

1

1
1

25

i

|
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REPORTERS CERTIFICATE
State of Utah

)
:
County of Salt Lake )

ss.

I, Gayle B. Campbell, do hereby certify:
That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of
the State of Utah; that on the 19th day of March, 1985, I
attended the within matter and reported in shorthand the
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said shorthand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the fore-j
going pages, numbered from 1 to 13, inclusive, constitute a
full, true and correct account of the same to the best of my!
ability.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this

day of

April, 1985.

Gayle B. Campbell,
iri7.issj.cn E x p i r e s :
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ttorney for Plaintiff
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Jalt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Telephone: 534-1148
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOAN H. ELTON,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 84-347
Consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
Judge Rigtrup

CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the above
entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 1985, before the
Honorable Kenneth •. Rigtrup, District Judge. Plaintiff was
present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser.
Defendant was present in person and represented by his attorney,
Bert L. Dart. The Court held an informal Pre-trial conference
with counsel in chambers; and the parties thereafter, through their
respective attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all
of the matters in the above entitled cause of action, which stipulation was read into the record, and acknowledged, accepted and
approved by the parties hereto, and each of them and their respective
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counsel; and, the Defendant having stipulated that his Complaint
(Civil No. 84-348) consolidated with this action and deemed to
oe an Answer and Counterclaim, may be withdrawn and his default
entered to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the default of Defendant
having been duly entered by the Court; and the stipulation and
settlement agreement of the parties having been approved by the
Court; and the Plaintiff having been sworn and testified in
support of the allegations of her Complaint on file herein

and

more than ninety (90) days having lapsed since the commencement
of this action; and the matter having been submitted to the
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, being
fully advised in the premises, does now make and adopt the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff is a resident of Tooele County, State

of Utah and has been for more than three (3) months prior to the
commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were married December 28, 1977

at Las Vegas, Nevada.
3.

That no children have been born as issue of the marriage

between Plaintiff and Defendant and none are expected.
4.

During the marriage relationship Defendant treated

Plaintiff cruelly causing her to suffer mental distress and nervous
upset in that the Defendant was very demanding of the Plaintiff
and critized her in front of family members, relatives and friends;
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exhibited a violent temper and verbally and physically abused
the Plaintiff, all of which acts caused the Plaintiff to suffer
extreme mental distress and nervous upset to such an extent that
continuation of the marriage relationship became impossible.
The parties separated on or about July 1, 1984 and have remained
separate and apart since said date.

The Court finds sufficient

cause existing for waiving the interlocutory period.
5.

Pursuant to the stipulation entered into between the

parties, through their respective attorneys, the Plaintiff is
to be awarded as her sole and separate property, free and clear
of all claims of the Defendant, the following:
(a)

All personal property owned by Plaintiff prior

to her marriage to Defendant, including and not limited
to, furniture, appliances, household furnishings; 1969
Chevrolet Corvette; 10 shares of common stock in American
Western Life; her own personal property, clothing, jewelry
and effects;
(b)

All of the furniture, furnishings, fixtures,

appliances, housekeeping supplies ahd effects in possession
of Plaintiff, including and not limited to, microwave oven,
dishwasher, sewing machine, two color portable television
sets, all building materials in possession of the Plaintiff;
her bank accounts in her name; the 1981 Toyota pickup truck,
subject to the balance of the obligation owing thereon to
the Tooele Federal Credit Union, which she is to assume
and pay and hold Defendant harmless;
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(c)

The home and residence in Plaintiff's name

located at 280 Marvista, Tooele City, Utah, subject
to the balance of the first mortgage indebtedness owing
thereon which she is to assume and pay, free and clear
of any and all claims of the Defendant; two (2) of the
four (4) lots located in the Gold Hill Townsite, Westward
Ho Addition, Tooele County, Section 1, Township 8 South,
Range 18 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

Plaintiff

shall have thirty (30) days from the date of the Decree
of Divorce to elect which two lots she desires to be
deeded to her.

Should the Plaintiff fail to make the

election within thirty (30) days from the date of the
Decree of Divorce, Plaintiff shall be awarded Lots 18
and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition.
Defendant will be awarded Lot 17 and 27 of Block C, Gold
Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition.
(d)

Plaintiff is to be awarded all sums on deposit

in Defendant's IRA Retirement account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union, including accumulated interest.

Defendant

is to make arrangements to transfer ownership of the
account to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is awarded all shares

of stock presently held by the parties in Pacific Gas
and Electric comprising 100 shares of preferred stock
and 18 shares of common stock;
(e)

Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff as her share

of the equity in and to the tri-plex located at 261 Marvista

4-
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Lane, Tooele, Utah, the sum of $10,000.00, payable
at the rate of $300.00 per month with interest of ten (10%)
percent per annum.

Payments are to commence on or before

April 15, 1985 and on or before the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter until the entire sum of $10,000,00,
together with interest at ten (10%) percent per annum is
paid in full.

Plaintiff is to have a first mortgage lien

on the tri-plex until the entire sum of $10,000.00 is
paid in full*
(f)

Defendant stipulates and agrees that he will

pay to Plaintiff to assist her in the payment of her
attorney's fees the sum of $750.00.

Said sum shall be

payable within thrity (30) days from the date of the entry
of the Decree of Divorce herein.
6.

Pursuant to the oral stipulation entered into between

the parties, through their respective attorneys, the Defendant is
to be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear
of all claims of the Plaintiff, the following:
(a)

The property owned by Defendant before marriage

to Plaintiff, including and not limited to, the 1976 Vega,
the Scotch Whiskey Future, proceeds from the sale of
Jonathan Logan stock, camping equipment, the black & white
television set, the other items of furniture and appliances
in his possession, and the proceeds from the sale of his
home at 990 Coleman Avenue, Tooele, Utah, which proceeds
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were used to purchase the tri-plex at 261 Marvista Lane,
Tooele, Utah; his own personal property, clothing, jewelry
and effects;
(b)

Defendants tools, table saw and drill press;

the courch and love seat received from his mother; the
bedroom set received from his mother; the washer and
dryer received from his mother; the 1985 Chevrolet van,
subject to the existing loan owing thereon which he is
to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff harmless; the one-third
(1/3) interest in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with
camper # subject to the balance of the loan obligation owing
thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay and hold
Plaintiff harmless; the one-half (1/2) interest in the
boat, motor and trailer; the 1978 Toyota Landcruiser;
the one-third (1/3) interest in the Willy's Jeep; the
750 Honda motorcycle with trailer; and his Federal
Retirement account with the United States Government;
(c)

Defendant is to be awarded the tri-plex located

at 261 Marvista Lane, Tooele, Utah, subject to any and
all indebtedness and encumbrances owing thereon which
Defendant is to assume and pay and subject to a first
mortgage lien in favor of Plaintiff in the sum of
$10,000.00, which lien is to be payable at the rate of
$300.00 per month with interest at the rate of ten (10%)
percent per annum, commencing April 15, 1985 and the
15th day of each and every month thereafter until paid
in full;
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(d)

Two (2) of the lots located at Gold Hill

Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, subject
to the option of Plaintiff to elect within thrity (30)
days which of the two lots she desires to be awarded
to her.

In the event Plaintiff should fail to make

an election within thrity (30) days from the date of
the Decree of Divorce, Defendant shall be awarded Lots
17 and 27 of Block C, Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho
Addition, Tooele County, Utah.

Plaintiff shall be

awarded Lots 18 and 26 of Block D, Gold Hill Townsite,
Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah;
(e)

Defendant is to be awarded all right, title

and interest in and to the home recently purchased by
him located at 291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah, subject
to any and all indebtedness owing thereon which he is
to assume and pay;
(f)

Defendant, by stipulation, is to be responsible

to assume and pay the debts and obligations owing to
GMAC for the 1985 Chevrolet Van, GMAC for the 1978
pickup truck and camper; First Security Bank loan for
attorney's fees, Tooele Federal Credit Union for
Defendant's personal loans; the Elton estate for all
sums borrowed, Rex Elton; the Mastercard account with
Tooele Federal Credit Union; and the Visa card account
at Tooele Federal Credit Union, together with any and
all other debts and obligations he has incurred since
separation and hold Plaintiff harmless;
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(g)

Plaintiff stipulates that she will be

responsible to assume and pay the debts and obligations
owing to Sears, Wards, J.C. Penneys, her truck loan to
Tooele Federal Credit Union, and all other debts and
obligations she has incurred since separation and
hold Defendant harmless;
(h)

Defendant is awarded his bank accounts in his

name except for his IRA account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union which is to be transferred to Plaintiff/
(i)

Each party stipulates and agrees that they will

execute any and all documents necessary to carry out the
transfers and awards of property, real and personal,
stipulated to, and approved by the Court.
7.

Plaintiff, at the time she married Defendant, was totally

disabled due to a loss of hearing (Tinnitus) and was receiving
disability benefits from her former employer, Tooele Ordinance
Depot.

Plaintiff receives disability benefits at the present time

of $659.00 per month gross.

Defendant is employed and working for

the United States Government at Dugway Proving Grounds and has a
gross income of $30,000.00 per year.

The parties stipulated that

alimony not be awarded to either party.

Under the present circum-

stances, it is reasonable that alimony not be awarded to either
party.
8.

Plaintiff has in force and effect a hospital and medical

insurance policy.

Defendant has in force and effect through his

employment, a hospital and medical insurance policy.
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It is reason-

able that each party be required to maintain their own hospital
and medical insurance policies for their own benefit*
9.

The Court finds that the oral stipulation entered into

between the parties is reasonable under the present circumstances,
does hereby approve said stipulation and finds that the same should
be incorporated in the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
to be entered herein.
The Court, having made its Findings of Fact, now concludes
as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.
parties.

The Court has jurisdiction of this matter and of the
The Plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce from

the Defendant upon the grounds of mental cruelty, which Decree
is to become final upon entry.
2.

That the oral stipulation and property settlement

agreement submitted to the Court, and duly approved by the Court,
which stipulation and property settlement agreement is set forth
in the Findings of Fact hereinabove, is adopted by the Court and
is expressly incorporated in these Conclusions of Law.
3.

Plaintiff should be awarded all of the real and personal

property stipulated to be awarded to Plaintiff and as set forth
in the Findings of Facts hereinabove
4.

Defendant should be awarded all of the real and personal

property stipulated to be awarded Defendant as set forth in the
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indings of Fact hereinabove.
5,

Neither party should be awarded alimony.

6.

Each of the parties should be ordered to execute any

nd all documents necessary to carry out the awards of property
tipulated to between the parties and as set forth in the Findings
>f Fact hereinabove;

Further, each of the parties should be

»rdered to deliver those items of property in their possession
iwarded to the other party.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

/I
BY THE

day of April, 1985.

URT:

KENNETH 3*. RIGTRi
DISTRICT JUDGE

Approved as to form:

A

i

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant
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TOOELE CCWTY

E. H. FANKHAUSER
Bar No. 1032
Attorney for Plaintiff
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY# STATE OF UTAH

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
Civil No. 84-347
Consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
Judge Rigtrup

vs.
CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

This cause came on for trial at a regular term of the
above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on March 19, 198 5, the
Honorable Kenneth

Rigtrup, District Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff

was present in person and represented by her attorney, E. H.
Fankhauser.

Defendant was present in person and represented by

his attorney, Bert L. Dart. The parties, through their respective
attorneys, entered into a stipulation concerning all of the matter?
in the above entitled action; and which stipulation was acknowledged#
accepted and approved by the parties hereto, and which stipulation
was approved by the Court and ordered to be included in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the Decree of Divorce herein;
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and# the default of Defendant having been duly entered by the
Court to the Complaint of Plaintiff; and the Plaintiff having
been duly sworn and testified in support of the allegations of
her Complaint on file herein; and more than ninety (90) days
having lapsed since the commencement of this action; and the
matter having been submitted to the Court for its determination
and decision; and the Court, having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and in accordance therewith, now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS;
1.

That Plaintiff, JOAN ELTON, be and is hereby granted

a Decree of Divorce from Defendant, CURTIS BECK ELTON, dissolving
the bonds of matrimony presently existing between Plaintiff and
Defendant, which Decree of Divorce is to become final upon entry•
2.

Plaintiff be and is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property, free and clear of all claims of Defendant,
the following, to-wit:
(a)

The home and residence owned by Plaintiff

before marriage located at 280 Marvista, Tooele, Utah
subject to the balance of the mortgage indebtedness
thereon which he is to assume and pay;
(b) All furniture, household furnishings, appliances
and effects in her possession, except for the items
specifically awarded to Defendant;
(c)

1969 Corvette owned before marriage; 1981

Toyota pickup truck, subject to the balance of the
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obligation owing thereon to Tooele Federal Credit Union
which she is to assume and pay and hold Defendant harmless;
(d)

Ten (10) shares American Western Insurance

stock owned before marriage; 118 shares Pacific Gas and
Electric stock (100 shares preferred, 18 shares common);
(e)

All bank accounts in Plaintiff's name, including

Plaintiff f s IRA account*

Defendant's IRA account with

Tooele Federal Credit Union.

Defendant is ordered to

change over his IRA account to the name of Plaintiff;
(f)

$10,000.00 representing Plaintiff's share of the

equity in and to the tri-plex property, which sum is to
be paid out at the rate of $300.00 per month commencing
on or before April 15, 1985 and the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter with interest at the rate of ten
(10%) per annum until paid in full.

Plaintiff is to have

a first mortgage lien on the tri-plex to secure payment
of this amount;
(g)

All building materials in Plaintiff's possession,

together her personal property, clothing, jewelry and effects.
3.

Defendant be and is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property, free and clear of all claims of Plaintiff, the
following, to-wit:
(a)

The tri-plex located at 261 Marvista, Tooele,

Utah, subject to any and all indebtedness and encumbrances
thereon which* he is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff
harmless and subject to a mortgage lien in favor of
-3A-27

Plaintiff in the sum of $10,000.00 payable at the
rate of $300.00 per month commencing on or before the
15th day of April, 1985 and the 15th day of each and
every month thereafter until paid in full, together with
interest at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum;
(b)

The Scotch Futures owned by Defendant before

marriage; all proceeds from the sale of the Jonathan Logan
stock; together with Defendant's bank accounts in his
name, except for Defendant's IRA account with Tooele Federal
Credit Union, which account and all sums on deposit therein
is to be awarded to Plaintiff.

Defendant is to arrange

for transfer of the IRA account to the name of Plaintiff;
(c)

1978 Toyota Landcruiser, one-third

(1/3) interest

in the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck with camper, subject
to the balance of the indebtedness owing thereon which
Defendant is to assume and pay and hold Plaintiff
harmless; the 1985 Chevrolet Van, subject to the indebtedness owing thereon which Defendant is to assume and pay
and hold Plaintiff harmless; one-half

(1/2) interest in

the boat, motor and trailer, the Honda motorcycle with
trailer, the one-third (1/3) interest in the 1953 Willy's
Jeep; 1976 Vega owned before marriage;
(d)

The items of furniture, furnishings and appliances

in possession of Defendant, together with the furniture
received from his mother consisting of a couch, love seat,
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bedroom set, washer and dryer;
(e)

Defendant's retirement account with the

United States Government, Department of the Army;
(f)

The residence recently purchased located at

291 East Broadway, Tooele, Utah;
(g)

Defendant's tools, including his table saw

and drill press and his own personal property, clothing,
jewelry and effects.
4.

Each of the parties are awarded two of the lots located

at Gold Hill Townsite, Tooele County, Utah.

Plaintiff is to have

thirty (30) days from the date of the entry of this Decree of
Divorce to elect which lots she desires to be awarded to her.
Should Plaintiff fail to elect which lots she desires to be
awarded to her, Plaintiff will be awarded Lots 18 and 26, Block D,
Gold Hill Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah;
and Defendant will be awarded Lots 17 and 27, Block C, Gold Hill
Townsite, Westward Ho Addition, Tooele County, Utah.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the balance

of the mortgage indebtedness owing on her home, the balance of
the loan obligation owing on the 1981 Toyota pickup truck, Sears,
Wards, J.C. Penneys and any obligations and debts she has incurred
since commencing this action and hold Defendant harmless.
6.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all debts and

obligations owing on the tri-plex, GMAC on the 1985 Chevrolet Van,
GMAC on the 1978 Chevrolet pickup truck, the obligation owing to
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Lrst Interstate Visa card, First Interstate Mastercard, his
»rsonal loans to First Security Bank and Tooele Federal Credit
lion and all other debts and obligations he has incurred since
aramencement of this action and hold Plaintiff harmless.
7.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

8.

Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sura

£ $750.00 for theuse and benefit of her attorney to assist her
a the payment of her attorney's fees and costs.

Each party shall

e responsible to pay the balance, if any, on their own attorney's
ees and costs incurred in this action.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to execute any and

11 documents necessary to carry out the awards of property as
.et forth herein.
DATED this

BT
/*

day of April, 1985,

BY T

ETHB*'. RIGT:
DIS^ tICT JUDGE
Approved as to form: ;

STATE OF UTAH
)
County* T o o *
)m
DBMS ft BWNQ, Courty CbA and Br-Oflfcte C t t t f t * OMUQMt of

»».Tfew * * u oma tt o» ant o» u&n, in *6 t * 1

B. L. DART
Attorney for Defendant
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mm.i±£iZ By.
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University CLub Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

APR 2 9 'dw
DRT, ADMSN, PRKN & PRCTft

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-cOoJOAN B. ELTON,
APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL
Plaintiff.
-vsCivil No. 84-347
consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
(Judge Rigtrup)

CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

COMES NOW William B. Parsons III of Salt Lake a t y , Utah, and hereby
enters his appearance as counsel for the Plaintiff Joan H. Elton in the
above entitled matter.
DATED this J£S

day of _J\ptUX

» 1985.

U>v. \S>.

TOA
CLKS-Gm.
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy? of the
the above and foregoing was mailed postage prepaid this &<> day of
, 1985,
to:
B.L. Dart
DART, ADAMSCN. PARKEN & PROCTOR
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jer/
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U
Gay Carte/, Secreta
Secretary

R

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300

FCF|VFn

APR 2 9 1985
Cff

-*-••'*. PRKH * PRCJR

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-oOoJOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff.

1
|1
1

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL OR
IN THE ALTERNATIVE A MOTION
TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT

|I
i
i

C i v i l No. 84-347
consolidated with 84-348
(Judge Rigtrup)

-vsCURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant.

COMES NCW the Plaintiff by and through her attorney of record William
B, Parsons III and moves the above pntitled Court in conformity with the
provisions of Rule 59(a) and 59(e), for a new trial in the divorce proceeding
between Plaintiff and Defendant or in the alternative for an amended Judgment
and altered Decree of Divorce•
She Plaintiff substantiates in part the Motion for a New Trial on the
provisions of Rule 59(a) (6) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and asserts that no
evidence was taken by formed sworn testimony nor were any documents admitted
after a foundation was properly laid except the matter of grounds and
jurisdiction and the general agreement as to understanding by the Plaintiff
and that the evidence is not in any form sufficient to support the decision
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or Decree or tne division of property as set forth in said Decree. The
nature of the agreements between the parties were not because of the
averments in Plaintiff's Affidavit sufficient to sustain the cVcifO<.*;;• w«!
determination of the Decree and a division of the property as is e\;V< j.. «><T 1;*
the Decree is not supported even by the general averments, proffers and
representations, the nature of the division being excessive in favor of the
Defendant, prejudicial to the rights of the Plaintiff, and not in the
interest of justice.
Rule 59(a) (1-4), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, require Affidavits to
substantiate and support them as foundations for a new trial and the
Plaintiff has in her Affidavit asserted irregularities in the proceedings
which prevented her frcra having a fair trial, entitling her to a new trial on
the merits.
In the alternative, should the Court not grant a new trial, the
Plaintiff requests an extension of time in which to supply additional
Affidavits to evidence such a disproportionate distribution of property
acquired during the course of the marriage in favor of the Defendant and
against the Plaintiff's best interest as to entitle the Plaintiff to an
amendment of the existing Judgment and Decree of Divorce. It is the
assertion of the Plaintiff that the distribution evidenced by the existing
Decree so disproportionately favors the Defendant as to not be reasonable,
prudent or in the interest of justice and as to not otherwise be justified
based upon the evidence or proffers made at the time of the original hearing.
DATED this S6

day of

r4/l^_y

, 1985.

JO**-

WILLIAM B. PARSONS III
Attorney for Plaintiff
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MAILING CERTIFICAIE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing was mailed postage prepaid this

as day of

AJLIJI

, 1985,

to:
B.L. Dart
DART, ADAKSON, PARKEN & PRCODR
310 South Main #1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
er, Secretary
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WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535
PACE, KLIMT. WUNDERLI & PARSONS
1200 University d u b Building

AKK ^ 9 l935
nDr

DRr Al)

136 E a s t South Temple

-

-'-^ PRKN 6 PRCTft

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1300
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-cOoJOAN H. ELTON,

AFFIDAVIT

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No. 84-347
consolidated with
Civil No. 84-348
(Judge Rigtrup)

CURT1S BECK ELTON,

Defendant.

I, Joan H. Elton, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that:
1.

I am the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter.

2.

A divorce trial was conducted between myself and the Defendant on

or about the 19th day of March, 1985.
3. A Decree of Divorce, as the final Judgment in that proceeding, was
signed by the Court and filed with Tooele County Clerk's office on April 16/
1985.
4.

That as the Plaintiff in the above entitled matter at the time of

the divorce trial I was pressured by my attorney, into the seJiLsnejvt, I did
not agree with the context of the settlement and was told by my attorney that
he was going to see that it took place in the fashion that the decree
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evidences*
5. That I wear a hearing aide and cannot hear with out it,
6. That on the day of the divorce trial I could not hear because my

t

hearing aide was not functioning properly and because I had at that time a
severe ear infection and I told my attorney, E.H, Fankhauser, of ny problem,
asked him to seek a continuance and he refused insisting that the proceeding
go forward anyway.
1.

lhat irregularities in the proceeding of the Court occurred in that!

the Defendant's counsel, B.L. Dart, had an extended conference with the Judge}
before Plaintiff's counsel arrived at the Court.
8« That the evidence is not sufficient in any form to support the
decision as evidenced in the Decree of Divorce dividing the marital estate ir
'th limited particularity the following is asserted:

f

A. ttiat the evidence was that the Tri-Plex acquired by the partie
during the course of the marriage had a fair market value of
well in excess of $80,000.00, that the evidence clearly
*

indicated that the Defendant contributed no more than
$31,000.00 of monies brought in to the marriage to the
acquisition of the Tri-Plex and that the Plaintiff was awarde

\

only a $10,000.00 lien against the Tri-Plex therefore grantir
V

in excess of a $40,000.00 difference and a $30,000.00 windfa:

\

to the Defendant.

' B. That even if the Tri-Plex was valued at $68,000.00 the
'

arithmetical computation would indicate that the Defendant

,'

still accrued a two to one equity benefit in the distributic

lot)
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of that marital property.
9.

That considerable additional marital property was improperly

valued and that the Defendant accrued substantial excessive distribution per
the Decree.
10.

That the Plaintiff through the contribution of time, labor and

monies during the course of this eight year marriage also made substantial
contribution to the equity in the properties including the Tri-Plex which
should have reduced the Defendant's disproportionate original investment to
zero.
U.

That in essence the Defendant caused the Plaintiff's present

physical disability to sane degree by virtue of the beatings and physical
abuse that the Defendant subjected the Plaintiff to during the course of the
marriager limiting the Plaintiff's capacity to sustain herself following the
division of their matrimonial bonds and yet no alimony has been awarded by
the Court and the Plaintiff asserts that this is a clear abuse of discretion
entitling the Plaintiff alone under the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 59(a) (1) to a new trial.
Further the Affiant saith not.
D M E D this J£L

dav nf

*• ~ 'J

, 1985.

m H. ELTON

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

day of

/

_1985

Notary Public/
Vtj Caimission Expires:

_

3-2M-81

Residing At:
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UJeJy

MAHJN3 CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Affidavit was mailed postage prepaid this £0_

day of

fiOAA

y

1985, to:
B.L. Dart
DART, ADAMSON. PARKEN & PROCTOR
310 South Main $1330
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
•

•

-

-

-

•

•

-

refci Gay Carter,
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J

^

Secret*
Secretary

B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooot

JOAN H. ELTON,
Plaintiff,

:

AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION
TO AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF

v.

x

CURTIS BECK ELTON,

:

Civil No. 84-347

:

Judge Rigtrup

Defendant.

oooOoooSTATE OF UTAH

)
• ss •
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
B. L, Dart, attorney for defendant Curtis Beck Elton,
being first duly sworn, replies to plaintiff's affidavit as
follows:
1.

In answer to paragraph 4 of plaintiff's affidavit,

affiant is not aware of what discussions plaintiff had with her
attorney but does represent that the settlement which was reached
was reached after extensive negotiation; was fully read into the
record in the presence of plaintiff and plaintiff at that time

1
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represented to the Court that she understood and agreed to the
terms of the settlement.
2.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 6 of

plaintiff's affidavit, affiant had an opportunity to observe, as
did everybody else in the courtroom, plaintiff on the day of the
trial and was able to observe that plaintiff engaged in
conversation, responded to questions in an appropriate fashion
and in every way demonstrated that she understood what was being
said.

No objection was made at the time of the hearing for a

continuance based upon an ear infection or malfunction in
plaintiff's hearing.
3.

In answer to the allegations of paragraph 7,

affiant denies that any irregularities took place by reason of a
meeting between the undersigned and Judge Kenneth Rigtrup.

Prior

to the arrival of either Judge Rigtrup or E. H. Fankhauser the
court reporter, Gayle Campbell, had invited the undersigned into
the District Court Judge's Chambers for a doughnut and a cup of
coffee.

The undersigned did not know that Judge Rigtrup was

going to be coming into the chambers in view of the fact that the
trial was scheduled in the Juvenile Court courtroom*

While the

undersigned was drinking his coffee, Judge Rigtrup did enter the
room and there was general conversation concerning the weather,
the drive to Tooele, the height of the Great Salt Lake, and the
University of Utah basketball season.
2
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There was no discussion

concerning the case between plaintiff and defendant including the
merits of the case or any issues in the case.
4.

Affiant does not respond to the allegations

contained in the remaining paragraphs of plaintiff's affidavit
for the reason that those allegations contain representations on
disputed issues of fact which never came on for trial before the
Court by reason of the Stipulation reached between the parties
and are not relevant to a request for relief under Rule 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure under circumstances where a
Stipulation has been reached by the parties and accepted by the
Court.
DATED the

day of May, 1985.

B. L. DART
Subscribed and sworn before me this
1985.

Notary Public
Residing at:
Commission expires:

3
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day of May,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of May, 1985, I

mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to
Affidavit of Plaintiff to:
William B. Parsons III
Attorney for Plaintiff
1200 University Club Bldg.
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, DT 84111
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1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

3

JOAN H. ELTON,

4

Plaintiff/Appellant,

5

vs.

6
7
8

C i v i l No.

84-347

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

CURTIS BECK ELTON,
Defendant/Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

9

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled case

10
11

came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth

12

Rigtrup, a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of

13

the State of Utah, at Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah,

14

on the 20th day of May, 1985, and the following proceedings

15

were had.

16

A P P E A R A N C E S :

17
18

For the Plaintiff

William B. Parsons III, Esq.
Pace, Klimt, Wunderli & Parso
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

For the Defendant;

Bert L. Dart, Esq.
Dart, Adamson, Parken & Proct
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

19
20
21
22
23
24

25

CAYLE B. CAMP2ELL
A-4 3

CtRllfliD SriORTHANO REPORTER
. . . » • w c riTY

UTAH

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

May we have Joan H. Eltpn

versus Curtis Beck Elton, Civil No- 34-347.

May we have

your appearances for the record, please?
MR. PARSONS:

William Parsons in behalf

of the petitioner, Joan Elton, your Honor.
MR. DART:
defendant.

B. L. Dart on behalf of the

Actually, two actions were filed and consolidated

Under this action Mrs. Elton was the plaintiff, so in this
proceeding we are representing the defendant.
THE COURT:

Mrs. Elton, why don!t you

come up here where you can hear a little better.

The record

may reflect the presence of both plaintiff and defendant.
You may proceed, Mr. Parsons.
>!R. PARSONS:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, briefly, the petition as it has been submitted
to the Court, the motion as it has been submitted to the
Court is a motion for a new trial, or in the alternative,
a motion to amend the existing decree of divorce and findings
of fact and conclusions of law.

That is predicated upon the

principles set forth in the Rules of Procedure, Rule 59(a)
and 59(e).

I would suggest that the basic concepts as set

forth in the affidavit and in the motions themselves are
well stated.

I did not, however, at the time of the filing

of the affidavit have particulars upon which to base the

A-44

2

motion beyond just in its roughest form.
By way of presentation today, not to be excessive
verbose, but if the Court would grant me the privilege of
giving some particulars, I would like to quickly show what
I consider to be the gross inequities in the distribution o
marital assets for the purposes of then evidencing why we
ought to go into a hearing.
THE COURT:

You may proceed.

MR. PARSONS:

Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, during the course of this marriage, the marriag
having taken place in approximately 1977, there was a triplex that was acquired that was a major portion of the
marital estate.

That triplex is mentioned in the affidavit

That triplex is part of the decree and its distribution,
and the triplex was given to the defendant, Mr. Elton.
Elton, it is our understanding —

Mr.

and I'm working on a

limited amount of information because of my newness in the
case —

but it's my understanding that Mr. Elton had the

opportunity of contributing up to $31,000 worth of value to
the repair and the acquisition cost of that triplex.

The

plaintiff, if having had the opportunity to present evidence
would have presented evidence to show that that triplex was
valued at $80,000 at the time of the divorce.

Thirty-one

from eighty is approximately $49,000, and Joan received a
$10,000 lien against the interest in the divorce.
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3

1 i

It was the representation, and my understanding

2 j is

~

3 j

THE COURT:

4 j ing you.

Ifm not sure that I'm track-

Are you saying the triplex was free and clear?

5

MR. PARSONS:

Yes, and that there was

6

$67,000 —

7

contributed from pre-marital assets some $31,000.

8

the marital equity amounted to approximately $49,000, and

9

she got ten.

10

I mean $80,000 worth of value equity, and that he
So that

Now, it was the defendant's position that the

U

triplex was worth less than $80,000.

\2

indicated that, to the best of my knowledge, that the tri-

13 I plex was worth about $68,000.
14

But even if it is sixty-

eight, thirty-one from sixty-eight gives you some $37,000,

15 I and again, she got ten.
16

In fact, the defendant

And that would be a three-to-one

distribution.

17

Now, during the course or the life of this triplex

18

with the marriage, Mr. Elton was in charge of the receipt

19

of the rents, and received in excess of $31,000 in 1981,

20

f

21

money that was received from rent, but the rents changed and

82, and '83 alone.

In 1984 there was an additional sum of

22 j we don't know the exact figures.

That $31,000 was used

23

exclusively by Mr. Elton during the course of the marriage,

24

and Mr. Elton maintained separate accounts.

25

THE COURT:
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During which period of time?

1 .
i
2 ! 1981 and '83.

MR. PARSONS:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. PARSONS:

During the marriage between'

How much did he receive?
$31,680 for those three

5

years, plus rents from the 1st of January of '85 through

6

the time of the divorce.

7

approximately $4,000

8

three and a half to four thousand dollars.

And they would have amounted to

during that period of time.

Roughly

That marital
j

9
asset was exclusively controlled and maintained in terms of
10
the rent acquisition.

Not the work that went into it, mind

11
you, and not the responsibility for it.

But in terms of the j

12
use of the proceeds of the rent by Mr. Elton, the defendant I
13
in this case, Mr. Elton maintained separate accounts.

This j

14

!

15

marriage was a little different than your ordinary marriage ;
and your economic basis in that he bought and sold what he [

j
16

wanted to buy and sell, and we don't know what happened to

17

that $31,000.

IS

and we believe we ought to have some distributive interest

19

in that thirty-one thousand plus.

20

thirty-five thousand with the 1985 rents on it.

21

j

But we think that it went to his own purpose, !
j

It's probably closer to

Now, your Honor, those are reasonably nebulous
I

22

concepts, but I'll be very specific in the following.

23

the course of the marriage there were bank accounts that

24

were established, and Mrs. Elton received cash or cash

25

equivalent stock certificates or cash in the amount of about {
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During

$5,700.

In fact, S5,754 at the time of the termination or

this marriage.
THE COURT:

Fifty-seven what?

MR. PARSONS:
sir.

Fifty-seven fifty-four,

Mr. Elton received cash or cash equivalent amounting

to $20,987 plus, in the form of his government retirement.
And thatfs only marital contributions.

In other words, the

was part of the contribution that occurred only during the
course of time when he was married.

Half of that is $10,0(

And he received cash or cash equivalent or use
thereof over $20,000 at the time of the breakup of this
marriage or at the time of the divorce.
personal property

Now, relative to

—
THE COURT:

You're saying $20,000 in

addition to the twenty thousand nine eighty?
MR. PARSONS:

No.

Only the $20,987,

sir, versus her $5,754.
Now, in terms of the personal property distribut
that was made at the time of this divorce, Mrs. Elton received an equivalent for vehicles of $864, according to th
figures prepared by Mr. Elton's counsel.
believe —

And I'm led to

I don't know exactly who prepared these figures

but I think that it was Mr. Elton's counsel.

And Mr* Eltc

received a value of $3,783 according to these computations
Now, Mrs. Elton received no alimony as a result of this
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I
I

!

1 I divorce.

Mrs, Elton wears a hearing aid, is incapacitated, '

2 I had a hearing loss before the time that the marriage took
3 I place, but had that hearing loss, it is her position,
4

severely aggravated by physical abuse that occurred during

5

the course of the marriage.

And no alimony was awarded.

I

i

i

i

6

I would suggest that the aggravation of the hear- !

7

ing loss has given rise to a set of circumstances that would i

8 I have entitled her to alimony, even though she is receiving

J

9 | a payment from the United States Government in the form of

»

10 I a disability payment for having lost her hearing while she

,

j]

was working.
I

i

12

THE COURT:

Has there been any medical

I

13

j
i

evaluation of her hearing loss?
I

!

14

MR. PARSONS:

There has been a medical

;

I
15 J evaluation of the hearing loss, yes, sir.

j

16 I

j

THE COURT:

Is it rated any more

17 j severely now than what the Government rated it in compensat- .
18 I ing her?
19 I

,
MR. PARSONS:

I don't bear the burden

20

of proof relative to that at this particular point.

21

make the basic allegation.

22

there is an allegation of

I do know there was abuse, or
—

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PARSONS:

25

that's the allegation, sir.
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I only

How do you know that?
The allegation.

I say,

And the allegation is that

j

there was no hearing aid apparatus required before the abuse
took place.

The abuse was in the nature of a slap against

the head, an open-handed slap to the side of the head.

And

following that incident the hearing aid apparatus was required for any hearing.

•

Now, I've overlooked a good deal.

I've given only j
i
i

a sketchy concept, but I think basically the nature of the

i

rules are such, your Honor, that that's my responsibility at j
this point.

If I can show there is reason to believe, or

!

if I can show prima facie evidence to show that it is reason-

I
able to believe that there was a grossly disproportionate
distribution
justice of
is not
being served,
then we
ought
to have and
thethat
opportunity
re-opening
the matter.

;
i

Thank you, your Honor.
THE COURT:
MR. DART:

Mr. Dart.
My response, your Honor, is

.;

that we can respond to the specific allegations, and if the j
Court desires, I'd be glad to do so.

Mr. Parsons fails to
i

take into consideration substantial assets that she received j
in the form of appreciation in the house that she's living

j

in and reduction of the mortgage balance against that of

;

j
right at $20,000. It fails to take into consideration the j
inheritance that he received that was put into the triplex,
and in fact the pre-marital assets exceeded the value of the j
i

triplex, as can be testified to by Jerry Roper, who is here

.

to testify as a witness at the trial,

5

I

Their argument fails to take into consideration

a

I that this case was set for trial and we were here on the da

. | of trial and we were here prepared to try it, and through
.

the course of negotiations, a settlement was reached and

fi

that settlement was read into the record, and I would like

-

to offer at this time a copy of the transcript,
MR- PARSONS:

g

We so stipulate that that

did occur and that she was represented by counsel at that

9

time.

10

MR, DART:

11

In which transcript the Cour

can see that she was represented by competent counsel, Mr.

12

Fankhauser, and a full stipulation was read into the record

13

in the presence of both of the parties under circumstances

14

where each of the parties were asked if they understood the
15
.„ j stipulation and if they accepted the stipulation, and they
did.

17

And under circumstances during the proceedings v/here

18

Mrs. Elton was responsive to questions and obviously track-

19

ing with the discussion, responding appropriately.

20

under the circumstances, there has been nothing raised toda

21

that gives a basis for relief under Rule 59(a).

And

The stipu-

22 I lation that was reached between the parties is evidentiary
„

, information upon which the Court can rely in making a rulin
i

«4

and did so in signing the findings and decree tnat were pre

25

pared by Mr. Fankhauser.
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The stipulation is attacked on th

basis that she didn't understand, didn't comprehend, and
couldnft hear on the day of the proceeding.

Your Honor was

in attendance on that day, and I would like to just mention
a few places in the transcript where it is obvious that she
was tracking with the discussion.

It was on page 4, and we

were talking about lots that were located out here south of
Wendover, Utah.

And there was a question of which two lots

she wanted to have, and the Court indicated on line 18,
"plaintiff to have choice."

And Mrs. Elton, in response to

that, said, "Can I stipulate which ones later?

I haven't

seen the area."

f
*

On the next page Mr. Fankhauser, on line 2, says, :
t

"Do you understand what he's saying?
within 30 days.

You get your choice

Otherwise, he'll get the two in Block C

.
i

and you'll get the two in Block D."
"MRS. ELTON:

;

It was my understanding they were

right in Wendover."

j
j

Further on the Court talks about a tax return for j
i

1984, on page 10, and the Court says on line 6;
What happens to the 1984 tax returns?"

"All right. •

I indicate they have J

not been filed and that it would be his intention to file
separately.

:

And then Mr. Fankhauser, on line 12, turned to j

his client and says, "Do you want to file separately?"

And

she said, "Yes."
Finally, on page 11, the Court on line 5 says,

j

I
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—

-'

1

"Mrs, Elton, I assume you have heard what's been read into

2

the record?"

3 I

"MRS, ELTON: Yes.

4

"THE COURT:

5

"MRS, ELTON:

6

"THE COURT:

7

Do you understand those terms?
Yes,
Do you agree to be bound by those

terms?

8

"MRS, ELTON: Yes."

9

Under the circumstances, what we have here is a

10

desire on the part of the plaintiff to renegotiate a settle-

11

ment.

12

would result in almost every case being upset because some-

13

one else# after reflection, decided that maybe they didn't

It is a seller's remorse situation/ which if allowed,

14 j get as good a deal as they may have gotten.
15

I submit that v/e have no basis under the rules

16

for relief.

The basis for relief under 59(a) is that there

17

was, (a), an irregularity in the proceedings by which either

18

party was prevented from having a fair trial.

19

allegation that your Honor and myself had discussions in

20

chambers before the case.

21

feet that that discussion was under circumstances where I had

22

been invited for coffee and a doughnut, and related only to {

23 I nontrial matters.

There is an

I filed an affidavit to the ef-

And in any event, in view of the fact

24

there was a full stipulation entared into, the Court made

25

no rulings, nor could not have made any rulings on the case,
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1

so there is no way by which that incident could have had in

2

any way a bearing on whether she was prevented from having

3

a fair trial.

4

discovered evidence, but everything that's been talked of

The rules provide a basis for relief on newly

5 J today by Mr. Parsons as to the values in the properties,
6

the amount of rents that Mr. Elton received —

by the way,

7

there were payments against the utilities and maintenance

8

and mortgage payments, and the mortgage was down to a $900

9

balance when the divorce action was filed and had been paid j
{

10 I by the time of the divorce.

But during the marriage, during |

11 J the period when he received those rents, there was a mort12

gage balance.

13

All that information was available.

Now, it was not something that came to light after

14

the fact.

15

relief under Rule 59(a) or (e) is being requested consistent

16

with those rules, and that as such, that the motion ought to

17 j be denied.

And as a result, I take the position that no

With respect to the alimony issue, at the time
I
i

18 I of the marriage of the parties Mrs. Elton was not working.
19

At the time of the marriage she was drawing a disability

20

check for a hearing impairment, and the circumstances are

21

the same at the present time that she is continuing to draw

22 I that disability payment and is not working, although had
23

there been a trial we would have adduced evidence that she,

24

during the marriage, had employment at Kelly Girl, had been

25

able to carry on employment, but in fact was spending most o^

'

I j her time involved with her father's affairs in connection
i

, ! with real estate holdings that he has here in Tooele County,
*• i

3

And as such, the Court's determination of no alimony but a

4

property settlement paying her $300 a month for a $10,000

5

settlement is appropriate in all respects.
MR. PARSONS: Just a brief rebuttal, sir J

6

i
j

7
Thank you.
8
By way of rebuttal to Mr. Dart's comments, Mr.

j

9
Dart first mentioned the concept of Mrs. Elton*s home equity j
10

reduction and cited the Court approximately $20,000 mortgage j
•I | reduction.
j
l7

!

MR. DART:

No; five thousand reduction, !

I
la

j

! fifteen thousand enhancement.

•

i

}

-

14 i
MR. PARSONS: I wanted to — they had
j
1 5 made the allegation that there was a $15,000 enhancement in j
i

Ig

!

value during the course of the marriage in the document they j
i

17

, had originally prepared,, and in fact there was $4,500 in

\

.

I

;

I

j g « mortgage reduction during the course of their marriage.
!

j
i

19 ;
However, we would also point out to the Court that j
20 !
Mrs.
Elton
singularly paid that mortgage entirely and paid j
i
that out of her funds.
!
21
THE COURT:

22
23

who reduces it, does it?
MR. PARSONS:

24
25

That doesn't really matter

$4,500 reduction.
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No.

But there was only a

,

1I

THE COURT:

I understand.

2

MR. PARSONS:

There is a concept of the

:

•3 existence of the hearing loss, and whether or not Mrs. Elton j
I

j

4

could or could not perceive all that was going forth. T

*

I

*

i

i

5

have in my possession a doctor's letter indicating that Mrs. j

6

Elton, on the day after this proceeding, went to her hearing j

7

doctor for purposes of assisting her in acquiring better

8

hearing because she was not at that time capable of hearing j

9

well*

'

I have the hearing test results, in fact, but I only j

10

received those this morning and I cannot discern them.

I

[

11

can't tell to what degree she had a hearing impairment, but j

12
13

the report itself does say that she had to come in because
she couldn't hear, and that he had to help her because of

j
j

her not being able to hear.

I

•

14

*

And this was the day after —

I

!

I

'

15

THE COURT:

Generally, discussions

16

concerning settlement didn't take place in the presence of

17

the Court•

•
j

Mr* Dart did get here early, and there were some |
j

19 j doughnut old maids, or whatever they were.
18

I don't know

j
i

to
1

what
The reporter
brought They
in some
odds
and ; j
ends they
from are
Saltcalled.
Lake Doughnut,
or whatever.
were
a littie hard and stale, as far as I recall.

;
i

2
?

MRS. ELTON:

Your Honor, could you speak |

up, please, or talk into the speaker?
THE COURT: Can you hear me now?
MRS. ELTON:
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A little better, thank you.

I !

THE COURT:

The doughnuts that were in

2

on my desk, Mr. Dart was invited to have a doughnut.

The

3

case was not discussed.

4

rived, I generally discussed the case with Mr. Fankhauser

5

and Mr. Dart outside the presence of the parties, and there

6

was an inventory list of a lot of personalty.which I didn't

7

pay really much attention to.

8

having a home prior to the marriage, and I discussed the

9

issue of the triplex, and it was represented —

And then v/hen Mr. Fankhauser ar-

I addressed the issues of her

I don't re-

10

member the figures exactly, except I do recall the fact

U

that he put some $30,000, or received some $30,000 from a

12

home he sold at or about the time of the marriage, which

13

principally went into the triplex.

14

of him having some increased value in his retirement system.

15

And without getting into any nuts and bolts, I simply sua-

J

16

gested that it appeared to the Court that Mrs. Elton would

j

17

be entitled to something, and suggested that Mr* Dart make

18

some sort of a cash offer or a payment sort of offer.

19

as I recall, that figure was $10,000.

20
21

(

And I discussed the issue

And

j

I don't recall any of i
r
the details.
j
i
Thereafter, the attorneys left my office and
j
i

t

22
23
24
25

talked with both parties about the matter.

I was not in-

volved in any detailed discussions at that point.

i

And

assuming you were totally deaf, Mrs. Elton, Ifve dealt with
deaf people.

I don't sign, I don't talk with them, and it's j
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I
i
«

a slow and laborious process, but I have communicated to

I
•

them with my legal pad and pen.

;

And I have a hard time

understanding why, if you don't have full details at hand,
i

why you couldn't communicate with Mr. Fankhauser in writing,
The Court didnft come out in the courtroom/

if nothing else.

t

;

didn't direct the proceedings in any way, shape or form,
and so I wasn't involved in those details.
I think the record, if there is one, generally
bears that out.

We didn't discuss a great deal of detail — j

I haven't read the transcript, but I don't recall that they j
went through the nuts and bolts of the settlement offer in my;
presence at all.
MR. DART:

At the time that the settle-

ment had been reached, we then, in chambers, went on the
record and read the stipulation.

But before that point, your

Honor is correct.

|
I

THE COURT: I do have the recollection j
that the offer was made or the $10,000 figure was discussed !

j
in my presence * As far as I understand it, that was a start-!
i

ing point. Mr. Fankhauser and his client were certainly in j
a position to counter. I did discuss with both counsel that ;
§

I generally was philosophically inclined to follow the
rationale of the Preston v. Preston case, which simply
recognized that parties in cases of second marriage that had
pre-existing estates brought them into the marriage, and thatj

16
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they were restored to that position and were entitled to
that property back plus the appreciable gain on that property*

And it was within the context of those statements

that the parties addressed the settlement negotiations.
MR. PARSONS:

I don!t have any sub-

stantial dispute with what the Court has indicated.
that really isn't the basis for my motion.

In fad

We may or may

not be successful relative to the motion# but certainly the
fundamental basis of the motion is that there is such a
disproportionate —

a careful examination would show that

there is an incredibly disproportionate distribution of
assets, and as a result, there is an insufficiency of evidence to substantiate the award as it exists. Now, I think
that even though it may well be a strained concept, it
nevertheless falls within the provisions of Rule 59(a)(6),
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict.

Ordinarily

I understand the verdict would be a result of evidence submitted and adduced from a presentation on the merits and
not as a result of settlement negotiations.

The fact that

Mrs. Elton has evidenced her dissatisfaction with the representation that has taken place is neither here nor there.
It is evidence that she would have done something differently.

My point is that that did not occur.

It is up to

the Court today to determine, I believe, whether we do or
don't fall within the provisions of 59(a) (6).
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And if we do

I
I
1

*

{

J

1

we are entitled.

2

the prima facie presentation of the disproportionate distri-

3

bution is sufficient to put us within that provision,

4 j

And frankly, I think we do,

Now, even if we don't, sir —

I think that !

j

even if we do not,

I

i

5

the Court has continuing jurisdiction over the distribution

6

of assets in a marital estate, and we fall clearly within

7

the provisions of 59(e) in that we were timely, you do have !

8

continuing jurisdiction, and if there is an inequity that

9

I've evidenced to the Court, then we ought to be entitled to I

10

j

j

a hearing to justify —

11

[

THE COURT;

\

I'm not sure you have evi~

I

§

I

t

12

denced an inequity.

If the substantial portion of his sale j

15

proceeds went into the triplex, and if he had inheritance

I
14

•
payments during the marriage —

j

I
I

i
i

15

MR. PARSONS:

That didn't go into the

j
i

16 | triplex.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

It went into various marital

assets.
MR. PARSONS:

We dispute that.

We don't

think he. has put anything of his inheritance into the marital*
assets.
THE COURT: Where did the inheritance
go?
MR. PARSONS: Into his own personal
toys.

18
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1
2

THE COURT:

How much was the inheritai

figure?

3

MR. DART:

The inheritance was —

agai

4

if we've got a dispute of fact, then the time to raise it

5

was at the time of trial.

6

that he received was $5,000 inheritance, and at the same

7

time he borrowed from his mother $19,000. That loan was r

8

repaid until his motherfs death, and then was taken as a

9

diminution of the estate.

But in any event, the inheritar

So it was sort of a pre-inherit

10

amount, but it did go into the triplex.

11

sold for $35,000, then after selling costs there was $31,C

12

in proceeds, so our position would be that he had a $35,0C

13

asset and he should get $35,000 credit.

14

THE COURT:

There was a home

Well, at this point, withe

15

some more critical analysis, I don't see —

I don't see, c

16

the face of things, the shocking disprooortionateness of i

17

unless you can show me wherein the Court had some misunder

18

standing.

19

substantial proceeds from the sale of a home, that he had

20

substantial inheritance moneys or family moneys that by an

21

large carried the triplex.

22

in value.

23

marriage, and without going through detailed accountings,

24

which the Court didn't, the only other asset that had any

25

greatly enhanced value, other than the two pieces of

I was operating on the assumption that he had

And there may be some differen

She had a home as well that she brought into th
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1

property was the retirement,

2

!

MR. PARSONS:

There is a third piece of

a

real estate which also went to the defendant, Mr. Elton.

4

That third piece of real estate and all of its equity were

5

to his benefit, although the equities there were not sub-

6

stantial.

j

But it is in that particular piece of real estate I

I
I

i
i

7 j that a portion of his proceeds of his inheritance, if we
8 I understood it correctly, went. But that the triplex# o n
I
9 maybe as much as a five-to-one ratio, or maybe as little as
I

j
i
»
j
!
i

10

a three-to-one ratio, went disproportionately to the de-

11

fendant.

12

at least a three-to-one ratio, went to the defendant, and

13

the checking accounts and cash and cash equivalent accounts

14

on as much as a five- or six-to-one ratio went to the de-

15

fendant,

16

It is our position that the personal property, on

THE COURT:

17

!

Do you have any evidence at

all to present to this Court to suggest that the capital
I
i

»

18 j investment that went into the triplex wasn't substantially
19 I all his, and that —
20
MR. PARSONS: The original capital in21 vestment was his.

j
j

i
22 I

THE COURT:

All right.

And that appreci-j

23

ation thereon, to a large extent, was attributable as a

24

profit or return from that contribution?

25

MR. PARSONS:

Yes, sir.

I can address

20
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1

that issue.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PARSONS:

4

And building up that value?
Yes, sir.

That issue, I

can address.

5

I believe the concept is distinguishable between
I

i

[

I

6
7

the original investment capital and the appreciation on the !
property. It was basically garbage at the time they bought I
;

!

8
9

it. It was really deterioriated property. He only paid
;
something like $23,000 for a triplex, in whole, or the v/hole i

10

unit.

And then they went in together and they rebuilt it

!

I

I

I

:

And Mr. Elton did a ton of I

11

and they worked on it together.

12

work, Mrs. Elton did a lot of work, and the rebuilding of

i

13
14

this property was a marital endeavor of the parties. It
truly was. Sir, your analysis is correct, that it was the

j
*

!

i

i
15

original capital investment of the defendant, not the plain- j

16

tiff, that gave rise to the opportunity.

17

tunity would never have flourished had it not been for the

18

mutual endeavor of both plaintiff and defendant.

But the oppor-

And that

i

j
19

mutual endeavor enhanced the property in excess of three

!
i
\

20

times its original purchase price.

21

twenty-three, and if our evidence showed that there was a

22

market value of eighty, which would be more than three times

23

the value at the end of the marriage.

24

short period of time when my real estate was going to pot.

25

I have some considerable experience in recognizing the naturd

It was bought for

•

And that's in a
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1

of the depreciation that took place in 1981, 1982 and 1983. ;

2 I And theirs markedly increased, and it could only do that by
3

virtue of change in the basic character of that which

j

I

t

4 j existed.

And that change of character was attributable to

i

i

5

the two people, not to the one.

So I don't think that you

S

can attribute the theory that anything that is otherwise

1

associated with that which he brought into the marriage

J j vis-a-vis the triplex issue, goes back to him*

Because that

> wasn't the way it took place.
I I

Again, your Honor, I submit that the appropriate
thing —

and I do not wish to belabor it —

but I would sub- *

mit that the appropriate thing would be to set aside the

\

existing decree, hold an evidentiary hearing and make an

?

order accordingly.

i

MR* DART:

I
!

If the Court will allow me

to respond, looking at the triplex as one asset misconstrues
the totality of all the assets.

And as I say, there is

a disregarding of the $20,000 enhancement she had in the
home that she kept.

There is a disregarding of the money

that did come from the inheritance and a loan from his mother
i

that was used to upgrade the triplex from its original pur-

t
i

chase price.

We did prepare and have submitted to the Court .

an exhibit that we were going to rely upon at trial, which

j
j

under our approach would have put him in a posture of having
$4,000 and with a proposal of $2,000 paid from him to her

22
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to balance those equities.

Because of the negotiations,

that figure went from $2,000 to $10,000, and that's where
it stayed.

What bothers me that they are saying that based

upon her own stipulation, under evidence available to her
at the time, she now doesn't like it and she ought to be
able to come in and ask for a new trial.
not a basis under the rules.

I submit that's

I have a case of Kline v.

Kline, where an attempt was made to set aside a stipulation
i
i

under circumstances where the husband said he didn't under- !

i
stand what was being done.

The court found that the trial

j

S

court's refusal to set it aside was appropriate, and that
j
the court under all the considerations and using the stipula-!
i
i

tion could have made the ruling that it did. And whether
to set it aside is within the discretion of the court, but
there's got to be some rational basis.

»
i
;

Here there is none

i

except, as I say, for remorse that on reflection it wasn't

|

the deal that she wanted.
MR. PARSONS:

I just want to point out,

finally, that as long as there is no final judgment, and the
i

judgment is not final as long as we have filed within the
provisions of the rules, which we did, there is no final

{
;
t

judgment and the Court unquestionably has the discretion to j
either re-enter the case or not re-enter.

So it's a Question

of whether we have or have not given sufficient reason for
the Court to re-enter the issue and make a determination.

23
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I*11 submit it.

;
MR. DART:
THE COURT:

We'll submit it.
With respect to the trial of •
t

the matter, there were no communications to the Court as
to the plaintiff's underlying disability to go forward with ;
any trial.

There were no requests made of the Court to

continue the matter.

I

The matter had been noticed up for

some several weeks, had been set for trial, and it appeared
to the Court that both parties were present in person, were

t

represented by competent counsel, and were prepared to go
forward with the trial.
The matter of evaluation, I'm not sure what the
evidence would have been from either party with respect to
value.

I heard one or both attorneys, at least, and I take

it from what Mr. Dart has said that he at least had an

j
!

appraiser present to testify as to the value of the property J
!

There's nothing in the way of surprise to either
party.

They knew what the pieces of real property were.

5
i
It j

was apparent to both of them that there was a triplex, that j
there was a home that Mrs. Elton occupied, and that of

!
i
recent time during the separation period and shortly beiore j
i

trial, that Mr. Elton had acquired a new home which was substantially mortgaged, and there would have been little, if
any, independent generation of equity in.

It was obvious

who his employer was, and it was obvious that with little or

24
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1 j no trouble one could ascertain v/hat the increase in value
2

was in the federal retirement from the date of the marriage

3

to the date of divorce.

4 j difficult to value.

Those things, I don't think, are

They were the substance of the marital

5

estate, with the exception of a lot of toys, as are character

6

ized by Mrs. Elton.

7 j

And because those were known to the parties/ there

8

appears to be nothing that the Court's been made aware of

9

that was overlooked or is a matter of oversight.

It would

10

appear to the Court that there is no substantial basis for

11

granting a new trial or amending the stipulation at this

12

point.

13

MR. PARSONS:

14

THE COURT:

The motion is denied.

15

MR. DART:

Thank you, your Honor.

16
17

Thank you, your Honor.

I'll

prepare an order.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
* * *
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1

REPORTER'S

2 I State of Utah

)
:

CERTIFICATE

ss.

3 j County of Salt Lake )
4

I, Gayle B. Campbell, do hereby

certify:

5

That I am one of the Official Court Reporters of

6

the State of Utah; that on the 20th day of iMay, 1985, I

7

attended the within matter and reported in shorthand

|

the

8
proceedings had thereat; that later I caused my said short9 I hand notes to be transcribed into typewriting, and the fore- j
10 I going pages, numbered

from 1 to 25, inclusive, constitute a

H

full, true and correct account of the same to the best of my

12

ability.

13
14

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah this

day of

July, 1985.

15
16
Gayle B. Campbell
17 I
18 I My Commission

Court

Reporter

Expires:

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
Suite 1330
310 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
JOAN H. ELTON,

t

Plaintiff,
v.

:

ORDER

s

Civil No. 84-347
(Consolidated with 84-348

CURTIS BECK ELTON,

Judge Rigtrup
Defendant.

s
oooOooo

Plaintifffs Motion for a New Trial or in the Alternate
to Amend Judgment entered in this action came on regularly for
hearing on the 20th day of May, 1985, at the hour of 1:00 p.m.,
plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney William B.
Parsons III, and defendant appearing in person and by his attorn
B. !•• Dart, and the Court having heard argument from respective
counsel, and the transcript from the divorce proceeding having b
offered and received as an exhibit, and the Court having reviewe
the presentations and being fully advised,
1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff Joan H. Elton's
Motion for a New Trial and her Motion in the Alternative to Amend
the Judgment are both denied.
DATED this

day of

, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 21st day of May, 1985, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order to:
William B. Parsons III
1200 University Club Building
136 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant.
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